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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Kurt Vonnegut never advised the class of 1997 to wear sunscreen.1  Bill 
Gates may have a list of “Eleven Things You Won’t Learn in School,” but has 
not shared it with the world.2  Thomas Sowell disagrees with President Barack 
Obama’s policies, but does not dispute his American citizenship.3  And neither 
David Kaiser, Massachusetts Institute of Technology physics and history of 
science professor, nor David Kaiser, retired Naval War College professor, ever 
wrote an essay comparing President Obama to Adolf Hitler.4 
All, save Mr. Gates, have gone on the record denying authorship of each 
piece wrongly attributed to them.5  The “sunscreen” essay, a piece by Chicago 
Tribune columnist Mary Schmich, spread online billed as a commencement 
address Vonnegut gave at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.6  The 
“eleven rules” originated in a column, written by education reformer Charles J. 
Sykes, which ran in the San Diego Union-Tribune in 1996.7  An essay alleging that 
Barack Obama was not an American citizen, and therefore ineligible to run for 
president, circulated via email with Thomas Sowell’s name attached.8  Both 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Massachusetts Institute of Technology News, Vonnegut Gives Commencement Address – But Not 
at MIT (June 3, 1998), http://newsoffice.mit.edu/1998/vonnegut-0603 [hereinafter MIT News].   
 2 Carole Fader, Fact Check: Rules Might Be Cool, But They’re Not from Bill Gates, FLA. TIMES-
UNION (June 24, 2012), http://members.jacksonville.com/news/metro/2012-06-24/story/fact-
check-rules-might-be-cool-theyre-not-bill-gates. 
 3 Thomas Sowell, An Internet Fraud, JEWISH WORLD REV. (July 10, 2008), http://jewishworld 
review.com/cols/sowell071008.php3.  
 4 David Kaiser, I Didn’t Write That, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2012, at SR11, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2012/11/04/opinion/sunday/i-didnt-write-that.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Kaiser, I Didn’t 
Write That].  Professor Kaiser of the Naval War College detailed his experience with the essay on 
his personal blog.  David Kaiser, Life in the Blogosphere, HISTORY UNFOLDING (Apr. 11, 2009, 8:17 
AM), http://historyunfolding.blogspot.com [hereinafter Kaiser, Life in the Blogosphere]. 
 5 See MIT News, supra note 1 (“ ‘I think it was a darling column she wrote, but I would never 
do that to MIT,’ said Mr. Vonnegut.”); Sowell, supra note 3 (“Letters, phone calls and e-mails 
from readers around the country have asked me if I wrote a column saying that Barack Obama is 
not an American citizen. The answer is ‘No.’ ”); Kaiser, I Didn’t Write That, supra note 4 (“The 
essay, which has been promoted on blogs across the Internet, is attributed to a person named 
David Kaiser.  As it happens, my name is David Kaiser.  We are not the same person.”); Kaiser, 
Life in the Blogosphere, supra note 4 (“The email circulating widely attributed to me comparing 
President Obama to Adolf Hitler is a forgery. . . .”). 
 6 See Mary Schmich, Advice, Like Youth, Probably Just Wasted on the Young, CHI. TRIB. (June 1, 1997), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/chi-schmich-sunscreen-column-column.html. 
 7 San Diego Union Tribute archives, http://www.newslibrary.com/sites/sdub/ (click “search 
by date,” enter 9/19/1996 into both date fields, and search keywords “Some Rules Kids Won’t 
Learn in School”) [hereinafter UTSD Archives]. 
 8 See the full text of the essay at: http://www.snopes.com/politics/obama/citizen.asp.  
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Kaiser of MIT and Kaiser of the Naval War College learned that the essay had 
been circulating, bearing their shared name and the Naval College professor’s 
curriculum vitae.  The professors were able to trace the essay to a comment 
from a blog, but neither knows who attached their names, nor when.9 
In several of these cases, a simple Google search reveals the real author and 
original source of the falsely attributed work.10  Yet, despite the readily available 
Snopes.com articles11 or public statements to that effect, these works continue 
to circulate across cyberspace, bearing the wrong name.12 
The Internet facilitates episodes of false attribution such as these with 
greater ease and speed than print ever could.  Victims of false attribution—that 
is, “non-authors”—have limited, if any redress, and currently none at law.  
Professors Kaiser and Kaiser exhibit the best course of action available: when 
individual readers of the falsely attributed work contact each alleged author with 
feedback, the “non-authors” respond with a form email denying authorship.13 
Yet this approach hardly provides a cure for the unknown number of less 
proactive readers—those not moved to contact either professor.  For every one 
who emails or calls, far more passively encounter the work and do nothing 
besides associate the information with the alleged author’s name. 
This Note outlines a neglected problem—that of non-commercial, Internet-
spread, falsely attributed authorship—and proposes a solution.  When these 
works persist, bearing the falsely attributed names, those non-authors—who are 
often actually authors, albeit of other texts14—have pieces wrongly added to 
their canons.  Furthermore, the alleged author may not know his or her name 
has been attached to a work until long after the attribution has gained 
                                                                                                                   
 9 Kaiser, I Didn’t Write That, supra note 9; Kaiser, Life in the Blogosphere, supra note 9. 
 10 For instance, the second, third, and fourth results presented after searching for “Kurt 
Vonnegut sunscreen” reveal that he is not the author.  Notably, however, the first and fifth 
results listed do still falsely attribute the essay to him. 
 11 See Snopes, supra note 8 for Thomas Sowell; http://www.snopes.com/politics/soapbox/sc 
hoolrules.asp for Bill Gates; http://www.snopes.com/politics/soapbox/proportions.asp for both 
David Kaisers. 
 12 As of the 2012 election cycle, both David Kaisers continued to receive correspondence from 
readers believing either of them had authored the anti-Obama piece.  See Kaiser, I Didn’t Write 
That, supra note 4; Kaiser, Life in the Blogosphere, supra note 4. 
 13 See Kaiser, I Didn’t Write That, supra note 4; Kaiser, Life in the Blogosphere, supra note 4. 
 14 Kurt Vonnegut has written a number of acclaimed novels, such as Slaughterhouse Five; the 
“eleven rules” column attributed to Bill Gates allegedly came from a book he did actually write: 
“Business @ The Speed of Thought,” see Fader, supra note 2; Thomas Sowell is a well-known 
columnist; David Kaiser of MIT has written several books, including How the Hippies Saved Physics: 
Science, Counterculture, and the Quantum Revival.  See Kaiser, I Didn’t Write That, supra note 4. 
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prominence, and the damage has been done.15  Yet the originator of the false 
attribution is nowhere to be found. 
Additionally, the alleged authors suffer definable harm, analogous to that 
recognized in other realms of law.  This form of false attribution implicates 
reputation, a legally cognizable interest domestically, as well as the right to 
define one’s creative persona, which underscores moral rights, a legal regime 
prevalent abroad and partially adopted in the United States.16 
This Note proposes that the U.S. recognize an individual’s interest in 
preventing false attribution online, and adapt some existing legal protections to 
ameliorate the harm it causes.  Part II expounds on the problem further, 
examines the relevant laws and policies, and explains how they fail to address 
this specific problem.  Part III will advocate for the creation of a new notice-
and-takedown regime, such as the one codified in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, arguing that it would provide an expeditious, minimally 
burdensome solution to the problem for both author and unintentional (i.e., not 
the unknown original) false attributor.  Further, Part III will address potential 
drawbacks to the proposed solution.  Finally, Part IV concludes by reiterating 
the benefits of an anti-false attribution law, and noting that such a law does not 
conflict with the larger aims at the heart of U.S. intellectual property law. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
This section addresses the problem, the current state of the law, and the 
policies that support protecting authors from online false attribution.  Part A 
explains the online problem in greater detail, outlining what harm befalls an 
author whose name attaches to something he did not write.  Part B discusses 
moral rights protections, and illustrates how online false attribution directly 
implicates their underlying policies.  Additionally, it considers the arguments for 
and against moral rights regimes.  Part C examines the existing relevant laws 
that protect authors’ attribution rights, explains how, independently, each falls 
short of ameliorating the problem, but that each offers a piece of the solution.  
Finally, Part D discusses the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s notice-and-
takedown provision, and how, despite its faults, it could adapt to the problem 
of online false attribution. 
                                                                                                                   
 15 See Sowell, supra note 3. 
 16 See Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1990) [hereinafter VARA], and Part II.C, 
infra. 
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A.  THE PROBLEM: ANONYMOUS, ONLINE FALSE ATTRIBUTION 
The four episodes of false attribution described above share roughly the 
same five characteristics, which trace the scope of the problem herein 
addressed.  First, the work at issue is written and found on the Internet.  
Second, its source of origin may be known, such as the “sunscreen” and “eleven 
rules” articles,17 or unknown, as with the two works disparaging President 
Obama.  Third, the falsely attributed work has permeated the public conscience 
through rapid spread on the Internet, thereby obscuring the original source of 
the false attribution.18  Online written works “go viral” organically; it is all but 
impossible to find the starting point.19  Unlike false attribution in other 
contexts, then, the false attributor does not seek commercial gain from 
attaching the name of another to the work.20  Most often, there is no clearly 
identifiable reason for the false attribution, largely because the originator cannot 
be found.21  Fourth, because the party responsible for the false attribution is not 
identifiable, this is an asymmetrical issue: the alleged author cannot point to a 
single person or entity to take to court for false attribution.22 
Finally, the work continues to exist and spread online, through e-mail, blogs, 
or other forms of social media, even after third-party debunking or the non-
author’s denial.23  Furthermore, the work, with its non-author’s name attached, 
                                                                                                                   
 17 See Schmich, supra note 6; UTSD Archives supra note 7. 
 18 A New York Times piece written in the aftermath of the Vonnegut/sunscreen flap noted 
that “[t]here is no way to trace exactly what happened since the column appeared,” and 
interviewed a reader who said, “I have to say that I tend to get rid of those kinds of things really 
fast. . . . [but] [i]n this particular case, I thought it was poignant enough to forward to, I don't 
know, a whole lot of friends whom I believed would appreciate it.”  Ian Fisher, It’s All the Talk of 
the Internet’s Gossip Underground, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/ 
06/nyregion/it-s-all-the-talk-of-the-internet-s-gossip-underground.html. 
 19 See Kaiser, Life in the Blogosphere, supra note 4, noting that any efforts to find the original false 
attributor have proven fruitless.  See also Michelle B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interests: The Concordance 
of Copyright Law and Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, 1 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 601, 664–65 (2001) (“[C]omputer technology has freed expression from form.  The 
author’s expression is no longer trapped and tangible; it is fluid and malleable in cyber-space.  
These changes make it possible for anyone — not just publishers — to reproduce a work with a 
false attribution . . . .”). 
 20 Compare Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Inc., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), discussed 
below. 
 21 See, e.g., Fader, supra note 2 (“There’s no indication why Gates’ name was attached to the 
rules.”). 
 22 See Kaiser, Life in the Blogosphere, supra note 4 (noting that Professor Kaiser is unable to find 
the original perpetrator). 
 23 See Kaiser, I Didn’t Write That, supra note 4 (“After three and a half years of trying to debunk 
it, however, the Obama-Hitler essay still haunts the Internet (and my in-box).”). 
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continues to spread, even after authorship has been disclaimed.  Readers 
genuinely believe it originated from the alleged author.24  As a corollary matter, 
the work need not have any harmful effect on the author’s reputation.  Indeed, 
Vonnegut’s name attached to a wildly popular essay, which arguably enhanced 
his reputation and recognition with many readers.25 
B.  MORAL RIGHTS: THE FOUNDATIONAL ISSUE 
American intellectual property law tends to grant protections safeguarding 
the economic aspects of an individual’s creative contributions to society.26  For 
protection for instance, copyright exists to protect an author’s economic 
interest27 in his works.28  By contrast, moral rights recognize the intrinsic, non-
economic value that a work provides to its author; it represents the author’s 
expression, and so moral rights regimes seek to protect both that creative 
process, as well as the resulting product.29 
Jurisdictions that recognize moral rights vary in the protections they offer, 
with rights of integrity and attribution generally serving as the cornerstone 
rights.  The right of attribution—that is, an author’s right to receive credit for 
his or her work—typically enjoys the most attention of all the moral rights.  The 
                                                                                                                   
 24 See id. (noting that despite a Snopes.com post debunking his authorship, he receives reader 
feedback, largely positive, on politically significant occasions, such as elections or during public 
uproar over the stimulus bill in 2009). 
 25 This speaks to the need to incorporate protections afforded by moral rights, discussed 
below, which recognize that an author may still have a right that needs vindicating, even if he 
seemingly has not been harmed.  See Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: 
Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 945, 950 (1990) 
(“Note that article 6bis [of the Berne Convention, discussed below] does not protect only 
reputation; the inclusion of ‘honor’ as well as reputation supports the conclusion that the author’s 
moral rights could be violated even if the act enhanced his reputation.”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106A 
(1990). 
 26 See Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Author’s Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of French 
and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 555–56 (2006) (noting that 
American copyright law, while criticized for its economics-centric, rather than natural law, 
approach, does have its foundation in concepts of morality, such as administering justice). 
 27 Rebecca Tushnet, Symposium, Fixing Copyright: Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 
UTAH L. REV. 789, 790 (“[T]he legal rules governing [the DMCA] are explicitly geared at deterring 
infringement of the copyright owner’s economic rights, not the creator’s moral rights.”). 
 28 Later discussion will address the fact that this protection also only applies to actual authors, 
and therefore does not extend to victims of false attribution in the first place. 
 29 ROBERTA KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE 
UNITED STATES 5–6 (“Central to moral rights is the idea of respect for the author’s meaning and 
message as embodied in a tangible commodity because these elements reflect the intrinsic creative 
process.”); see also VARA, 17 U.S.C. § 106A.   
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United States, as a party to the Berne Convention, ostensibly must offer 
protection for this right.30  Article 6bis states,  
independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim 
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his 
honor or reputation.31 
However, moral rights law in the U.S. only exists in limited capacity.32  It has 
been described as a “patchwork”; no single comprehensive law governs or 
protects these rights, but artists have at their disposal several avenues by which 
they might attempt to vindicate these rights when violated.33  Further, as of 
now, no such protection exists in the context of written works, or anything 
besides visual works.34  
The sub-right against false attribution exists implicitly in the attribution 
right,35 and it dovetails with the right of integrity, which protects the author’s 
right for his or her work to exist as created.  The right of integrity 
                                                                                                                   
 30 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis(1), Sept. 9, 
1886, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention].  See generally Deborah 
Ross, Comment, The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New Obligations for Authors’ Moral Rights?, 
68 N.C. L. REV. 363 (1990). 
 31 Berne Convention, supra note 30, art. 6bis. 
 32 See VARA, supra note 16.  VARA only protects visual works, so no explicit moral rights 
protection exists for other types of works. 
 33 This Note will discuss several of these avenues as they apply to the problem of online false 
attribution.  See Justin Hughes, Symposium, Fixing Copyright: American Moral Rights and Fixing the 
Dastar “Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659, 666 (explaining the ten-element “patchwork,” including 
both federal causes of action under copyright and trademark, state causes of action under tort, 
contract, and moral rights regimes, and connecting the existence of this “patchwork” to 
Congress’s conclusion that it had no need to enact a comprehensive federal moral rights scheme 
in order to ensure U.S. compliance with the Berne Convention). 
 34 See generally Ross, supra note 30 (proposing and advocating for an authorial moral rights 
regime in the United States); Tushnet, supra note 27 (arguing against such a regime in the United 
States, owing to the difficulties of defining its limits, and the hardships it would impose on future 
artists’ ability to borrow influences from other creators). 
 35 See Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries, 
19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 229, 230 (1995) (“In addition to the rights of paternity (attribution) 
and integrity . . . many jurisdictions expressly include often moral rights: for example, a right 
against false attribution.”); Roberta Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the 
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 2004 (2006) (recognizing false attribution as an 
actionable component of an attribution right). 
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guarantees that the author’s work truly represents her creative 
personality, and is free of distortions that misrepresent her 
creative expression. . . .  Objectionable distortions, modifications, 
presentations, and even destruction of an author’s work damage 
authorship dignity because the author’s external embodiment of 
her meaning and message no longer represents her intrinsic 
creative process.  The resulting damage is particularly acute when 
the modified work is linked to the author through specific 
attribution or widespread public recognition.36 
Falsely attributing a work to an individual that he or she did not write thus 
magnifies this damage.  Indeed, attaching a false name imputes to that “non-
author” a creative process that never took place.  Quite literally, false attribution 
puts thoughts into an author’s head, and words into his or her mouth.  The 
attribution and integrity rights protect the author’s ability to have sole control 
over that internal process, an interest that exceeds pecuniary and even 
reputational damage.  The author damaged by false attribution simply does not 
want to bear responsibility for, or claim ownership of, words he or she did not 
write.37  
For example, Vonnegut was falsely alleged to have given a commencement 
address to graduates of an eminently respected institution of higher learning.38  
Despite the essay’s enormous popularity,39 Vonnegut had not written it, and 
presumably disclaimed it, in part, because he did not wish for the public to 
consider it part of his body of work.40  More insidiously, the essay attributed to 
Thomas Sowell exploited his criticism of and disagreements with President 
Obama. Beyond attaching Sowell’s name to a fringe political movement—alone 
a reason for him to disclaim authorship—the essay’s style did not match 
Sowell’s, thereby taking liberties with both his worldview and his means of 
creative expression.41 
                                                                                                                   
 36 KWALL, supra note 29, at 5–7. 
 37 Kaiser, I Didn’t Write That, supra note 4. 
 38 MIT News, supra note 1. 
 39 See Justin Alvarez, Wear Sunscreen: The Story Behind the Commencement Speech That Kurt Vonnegut 
Never Gave, OPEN CULTURE (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.openculture.com/2013/11/wear-sunsc 
reen-the-story-behind-the-commencement-speech-that-kurt-vonnegut-never-wrote.html (noting 
that, in addition to its proliferation through e-mail forwarding, the essay became a Billboard Top 
100 hit, after acclaimed filmmaker Baz Luhrmann turned it into a spoken-word song). 
 40 Indeed, the style seemed so similar to Vonnegut’s that his own wife sent it to friends and 
family, expressing her pride and delight at her husband’s alleged work.  See Fisher, supra note 18. 
 41 Sowell, supra note 3 (“Many of my readers have been savvy enough to tell that the style of 
the phony column is not mine, but checked with me just to be sure.”). 
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These authors did not seek economically based remedies.  Neither author, in 
each statement disclaiming authorship, expressed an interest in finding the party 
responsible for the false attribution, nor for seeking fiscal redress.42  Both 
merely wished that the public would acknowledge they had not authored the 
respective pieces and discontinue attributing the works to their names. 
C.  AGGREGATING A CAUSE OF ACTION: THE BASES FOR RELIEF ELSEWHERE 
AT LAW 
1.  The Visual Artists Rights Act: Moral Rights in American Law.  Congress has 
afforded moral rights to certain classes of artists, by enacting the Visual Artists 
Rights Act43 (VARA) in response to the U.S.’s accession to the Berne 
Convention.  Consequently, this law represents the best, and only, 
approximation of directly conferred moral rights protection in U.S. law.  
Congress expressed a willingness to recognize that creators have an interest 
in maintaining their artistic integrity, separate from reputational, property, or 
economic interests.44  Indeed, although technically part of the Copyright Act, 
VARA recognizes rights apart from those protected by copyright law.45 
However, Congress intended only to provide scant moral rights protection, 
as expressed in VARA’s legislative history, where one representative noted, “I 
would like to stress that we have gone to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the works 
of art that will be covered . . . [T]his legislation covers only a very select group of 
artists.”46  By all accounts, Congress succeeded. First, VARA only protects a 
                                                                                                                   
 42 See id.; MIT News, supra note 1.  While both statements disclaim authorship of the respective 
pieces, neither expresses any desire to discover or recover damages from the source of the initial 
false attribution. 
 43 17 U.S.C. § 106A  
(a) Rights of attribution and integrity. Subject to section 107 and independent of 
the exclusive rights provided in section 106, the author of a work of visual art— 
(1) shall have the right— 
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and 
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of 
visual art which he or she did not create. . . . 
 44 3-8D NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.06 (“In recognition of their link more to the author’s 
personality than pocketbook, moral rights stand in contrast to economic rights.  Accordingly, the 
newly created artists’ rights are independent of copyright ownership rights.”). 
 45 Id. (“[T]his new genus does not set forth a [protectable] ‘work of authorship;’ instead, it 
carves out certain already protected works to confer on them, and on them alone, a new species 
of rights involving attribution and integrity.”). 
 46 David E. Shipley, The Empty Promise of VARA: The Restrictive Application of a Narrow Statute, 83 
MISS. L.J. 985, 994–95 (2014) (citing HOUSE REPORT ON THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 
1990, H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6920–21, 
testimony of Rep. Markey) (“There is no doubt that Congress’s intent was to limit VARA’s 
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narrow class of creations.47  It does not apply to authors of literary works, who 
continue to have no moral rights protections in the U.S.48  Besides only 
protecting rights of attribution and integrity,49 some have argued that the Dastar 
decision some have argued that the Supreme Court’s Dastar decision, discussed 
below, “appears to suggest that VARA’s enactment promotes a negative 
inference that VARA is the only federal law locus for attribution rights: if 
authors already enjoyed attribution rights, VARA would be superfluous,” a 
statutory interpretation that the Court always seeks to avoid.50  Further, the 
rights granted in VARA exist only for the duration of the author is life.51  This 
means that even if Congress simply extended VARA to cover written works on 
the Internet, no remedy would exist for Vonnegut, who passed away in 2007.  
Vindicating the attribution rights VARA affords also requires using the 
expensive, highly formalized court system, and seeking an injunction, as 
opposed to less formalized mechanisms of extra judicial relief.52  Finally, as 
                                                                                                                   
application. . . . The definition of a work of visual art is a critical underpinning of the limited scope of 
the bill.” (emphasis added)). 
 47 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines “visual art” as: 
(1)  a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited 
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by 
the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated 
sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and 
bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or 
(2)  a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in 
a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or 
fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. 
 48 VARA explicitly excludes: 
(A) (i)  any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied 
art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, 
periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or 
similar publication. . . . 
Id. 
 49 VARA, 17 U.S.C. § 10A. 
 50 Jane C. Ginsberg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 263, 282 (2004) (“This is both perverse and wrong.  It is perverse because, given 
VARA’s very limited coverage, the result of this reading is to leave most authors with fewer 
attribution rights post-VARA than before.”). 
 51 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1) (“With respect to works of visual art created on or after the effective 
date set forth in section 610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 [note to this section], the 
rights conferred by subsection (a) shall endure for a term consisting of the life of the author.”). 
 52 See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 55, 56 (2010) 
(“The right of attribution under VARA thus gives an artist a claim for injunctive relief to, inter 
alia, assert or disclaim authorship of a work . . . . In failing to provide a damages remedy for any 
type of violation of the moral right of attribution, Congress may have concluded that artists could 
obtain adequate relief for the harms of false attribution by resorting to the Copyright Act and 
other traditional claims.”).  Cf. Digital Millennium Copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
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narrow as VARA’s protections are, courts’ interpretation of them has been 
narrower still, and those artists who do bring claims rarely succeed.53  The relief 
afforded thus does not lend itself well to mass episodes of false attribution, and 
the limited right granted renders successful claims few and far between. 
2.  Defamation: Indirect State Law Protection of Moral Rights.  Although not 
explicitly intended to protect an author’s moral rights, the common law tort of 
defamation54 can sometimes serve as a proxy for moral rights legislation in cases 
of false attribution.55  A successful defamation claim requires that the plaintiff 
prove injury to his or her reputation from the defendant’s false statements to 
another person.56  Thus, on its face, defamation law does provide some relief to 
falsely attributed authors. 
Indeed, some authors have successfully pursued defamation claims in order to 
vindicate their right against false attribution.57  These cases may seem to obviate 
the need for any more comprehensive scheme of moral rights legislation.  After 
all, “various state-law doctrines [including defamation] . . . have provided more 
comprehensive moral-rights protection, albeit indirect protection.”58  On its face, 
defamation offers authors the protection they seek when their names have been 
attached to something they did not write. 
                                                                                                                   
 53 Shipley, supra note 46, at 988–89 (noting that courts have taken seriously Congress’s 
expressed intent that VARA encompass a limited scope, and thus claims artists bring under 
VARA rarely succeed); see also Patricia Alexander, Moral Rights in the VARA Era, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1471, 1477 (2004) (“[VARA] is so tightly defined that only a single damaged artist — a sculptor 
— has received satisfaction in the courts.  The rest have all fallen victim to the many ways in 
which the language of VARA has excluded their claims.”). 
 54 For a discussion of other state law tort claims, such as the rights to privacy and of publicity, 
see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985). 
 55 Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights Protection and Resale Royalties for Visual Artists in the United 
States: Development and Current Status, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 387, 391 (1994); Kwall, supra 
note 54, at 18 (referring to defamation as one of the “principal doctrines” employed to protect 
moral rights in America). 
 56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1976). 
 57 Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 168 N.E.2d 643, 645 (1960) (permitting an author to 
recover against his former publisher for falsely attributing his authorship to a mistake-laden 
edition of his book, for which the publisher was responsible); Ben-Oliel v. Press Pub. Co., 167 
N.E. 432, 434 (1929) (holding that publishing a well-known author’s name on a work that would 
damage her reputation was libel, and thus a newspaper was liable when it published an article 
falsely attributed to the plaintiff); D’Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 A.D. 453, 455 
(1913) (holding that falsely attributing an article to an author for purposes of subjecting him to 
ridicule constituted actionable defamation). 
 58 Dane S. Ciolino, Moral Rights and Real Obligations: A Property-Law Framework for the Protection of 
Authors’ Moral Rights, 69 TUL. L. REV. 935, 950 (1995).  
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Yet despite successful defamation claims, its limits have rendered it a poor 
substitute for false attribution as a whole.59  First, it requires some harm to 
reputation—thus, an author whose reputation has not suffered as a result of the 
attribution cannot bring such a claim.60  Second, it is axiomatic that one cannot 
defame the dead, and so only those living victims of false attribution may 
pursue a defamation action.61  Third, and most problematic, courts typically will 
not grant injunctions as relief in defamation cases—the very sort of relief a 
falsely attributed author would wish to seek.62  Fourth, an author wishing to 
successfully levy a defamation claim must have a specific defendant in mind in 
order to recover63—and in the case of online false attribution, the source of the 
false attribution often cannot be found. 
Thus, although authors do have defamation at their disposal to attempt to 
recover for false attribution, it provides incomplete relief—and in the case of 
online false attribution, likely none at all. 
3.  The Lanham Act § 43: Trademark as a Back Door to Attribution Rights. 
  a.  Section 43(a) Confusion as to Source: Closing the Back Door to Attribution 
Rights.  For a time, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act64 seemed to function as a form of 
                                                                                                                   
 59 Id. at 952 (“[D]efamation offers more limited protection than traditional moral-rights 
doctrine.”); see also Kwall, supra note 54, at 23 (noting the difficulty that American authors face 
when attempting to vindicate their moral rights, because they must retrofit their claims to existing 
causes of action). 
 60 Ciolino, supra note 58; see also Kwall, supra note 54, at 22–23, 25 (noting that authors must 
show some injury to their professional reputations, or exposure to contempt or public ridicule 
which has injured the author’s professional standing, and that moral rights encompass more than 
simply damage to an author’s professional standing). 
 61 Damich, supra note 55, at 391. 
 62 Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 70 (1948) (refusing to 
grant injunctive relief absent “a clear showing of the existence of libel”); see also Kwall, supra note 
54, at 25 n.91 (noting the courts’ reluctance to provide injunctive relief for defamation actions 
alleging false attribution). 
 63 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559, illus. 1-3, all of which describe instances of 
defamation as whether “A” has defamed “B” or “C” by making certain statements to others such 
as advertising in a newspaper or writing a letter.  In cases of online false attribution, “B” and “C” 
do not know “A’s” identity.  See also Kaiser, Life in the Blogosphere, supra note 4. 
 64 Specifically, under the heading, “False designations of origin, false description, and dilution 
forbidden” 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006), provides: 
(1)  Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any 
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, 
which— 
(A)  is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or 
13
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moral rights protection, especially in the context of false or misattribution.65  
This provision forbids use of another’s trademark so as to indicate a false 
designation of origin, thereby creating confusion about the source of the 
“thing” at issue.  Although the statute refers to “goods or services,” for a time, 
artists could attempt to use this provision to bring false attribution claims in the 
context of communicative works.  The Second Circuit’s 1976 Gilliam v. American 
Broadcasting Cos.66 decision represents the high watermark of this trend. The 
Supreme Court’s 2003 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.67 decision, 
however, curtailed § 43(a)’s use in this context, leaving artists with less legal 
protection for their works and their names. 
Gilliam concerned ABC’s airing of a television program created by Monty 
Python, the well-known British comedy group.  In a contract with BBC, the 
Pythons agreed to write and perform a series of comedy shows for television 
broadcast, over which they retained extensive creative control, especially 
concerning any alterations to their scripts.68  BBC could license the program to 
other networks overseas, however, and reached such an agreement with Time-
Life Films.69 
ABC acquired the broadcasting rights, and assured BBC and Monty Python 
that any edits it made would not mar the programs beyond making room for 
commercial breaks.70  However, when Monty Python eventually saw the tape of 
what had aired in the U.S., they were “appalled” by the editing job, which cut 
about twenty-seven percent of the content.71  The comedy troupe then took 
ABC to court, seeking to enjoin the broadcast of a second, similar program.72 
In overturning the district court’s denial of an injunction, the Second Circuit 
noted the damage that broadcasting these poorly edited renditions of Monty 
                                                                                                                   
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person. . . . 
 65 This Note will only address § 43(a)(1)(A), the “false association” prong.  For a discussion of 
§ 43(a)(1)(B), the false advertising prong, see Clint A. Carpenter, Stepmother, May I?: Moral Rights, 
Dastar, and the False Advertising Prong of Lanham Act Section 43(a), 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1601 
(2006). 
 66 538 F.2d 14 (1976). 
 67 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 68 Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 17.  The agreement gave BBC ultimate authority over any changes to the 
writing, but required the network to consult with Monty Python on anything substantial.  
Importantly, the contract did not authorize BBC to alter the program once the Pythons had 
recorded it. 
 69 Id.  Time-Life could only edit the programs to comply with U.S. broadcasting standards, and 
to fit in commercial breaks.  Notably, BBC rejected a direct agreement with ABC. 
 70 Id. at 18. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
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Python’s work would have on their ability to attract an American fan base.73  
The court rested its reasoning in part on § 43(a), which it said an entity violates 
when it makes a technically true representation of a product that creates a false 
impression of its origins.74  The court found that ABC’s representations that 
Monty Python had created, much less sanctioned, the badly edited program 
constituted such a violation, as the program “depart[ed] substantially from the 
original work.”75  Reasoning that the Lanham Act intends to protect against 
false designations of origin that would harm a plaintiff’s professional reputation, 
and that airing the program at all—even with a disclaimer making clear that 
Time-Life had heavily edited it—would cause such harm to Monty Python, the 
court granted the injunction.76 
The Gilliam court treated § 43(a) as a protection for an author’s right of 
integrity,77 noting that, “to deform his work is to present him to the public as 
the creator of a work not his own, and thus makes him subject to criticism for 
work he has not done.”78  Importantly, however, the court still rested its 
reasoning on the economic rationale that underpins copyright and trademark 
law: “the economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that serves as 
the foundation for American copyright law cannot be reconciled with the 
inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their 
work to the public on which the artists are financially dependent.”79 
This would seem to constitute an opening for an author seeking to have her 
name removed from a falsely attributed work, given the close relationship 
between the harm wrought by false attribution and attribution to a distorted 
work.  Indeed, for a time, artists moved under § 43(a) as a way to vindicate 
moral rights,80 so long as they met certain factual constraints.81 However, the 
courts’ concern about using trademark law—aimed chiefly at protecting 
                                                                                                                   
 73 Id. at 19 (“Such an injury to professional reputation cannot be measured in monetary terms 
or recompensed by other relief.”). 
 74 Id. at 24. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 24, 25. 
 77 Carpenter, supra note 65, at 1621. 
 78 Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (internal quotations omitted). 
 79 Id. 
 80 See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) (allowing a § 43(a) claim against a movie 
studio for crediting someone for another actor’s work); Waldman Publishing Corp. v. Landoll, 
Inc., 43 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994) (characterizing false designation of origin of a written work as 
actionable under § 43(a) because the author is the “origin”). 
 81 A plaintiff wishing to use § 43(a) to vindicate a claim must establish both “extreme 
mutilation” of the work in question, as well as “financial or professional loss” in order to succeed.  
Brooke Bove, Note and Comment, Moral Rights: The Moral of the Story Both for Authors and Publishers, 
32 WHITTIER L. REV. 335, 349–50 (2011). 
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consumers from confusion about the origin of goods and services—to protect 
copyrightable material limited the factual scenarios in which an artist could 
bring a § 43(a) claim.82  That overlap came to a head in Dastar, in which the 
Supreme Court severely limited the cause of action under § 43(a).83 
In the Dastar case, Twentieth Century Fox sued Dastar, using § 43(a), after it 
sold a minimally edited version of a World War II television special that 
Twentieth Century Fox had produced.84  Twentieth Century Fox’s copyright 
had expired, so rather than pursuing a copyright infringement claim, it filed suit 
against Dastar using § 43(a)’s false association prong.85  In denying this cause of 
action to Twentieth Century Fox, the Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion 
found that it had to define the term “origin” as used in § 43(a).86  If “origin” 
referred to the actual goods themselves—here, the videotapes—then Dastar 
was the origin.  If, however, “origin” encompassed the underlying source that 
had been copied, then Fox could rightly be considered the origin.87 
 The Court concluded that “as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase ‘origin of 
goods’ is . . . incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated the 
ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain.”88  Trademark’s 
consumer protection-oriented, rather than producer-oriented purpose 
controlled the Court’s reading of “origin.”  
The consumer who buys a branded product does not automatically assume 
that the brand-name company is the same entity that came up with the idea for 
                                                                                                                   
 82 Rebecca Rosenthall Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire 
Between Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985 (2002) (“When the product at issue in a 
particular reverse passing off case constitutes copyrightable subject matter such as art, literature, 
or music, the inquiry is especially complicated because courts must balance the policies of section 
43(a) against those of copyright infringement.”). 
 83 Such a result is not totally unforeseen.  Judge Murray Gurfein’s Gilliam concurrence 
cautioned artists and authors against relying too heavily on § 43(a), noting that it does not 
substitute for moral rights.  Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 27 (2d Cir. 1976) (Gurfein, 
J., concurring).  See generally NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 44, § 8D.04. 
 84 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 25–27 (2003).  Fox’s video 
series, titled “Crusade in Europe,” was based on a book of the same name by Gen. Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, which recounted his experience leading the American World War II effort in 
Europe.  The series combined images and video from various public sources with narration based 
on the book.  The series was broadcast on television for the first time in 1949, and after Fox 
failed to renew the copyright, the series fell into the public domain in 1977.  In 1995, Dastar 
edited down the series, made slight modifications to the series’ structure, and added different end 
credits.  It then sold its remixed version of “Crusades” as “World War II Campaigns in Europe,” 
and attributed production credits to itself. 
 85 Id. at 26. 
 86 Id. at 31. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 32. 
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the product, or designed the product—and typically does not care whether it is.  
“The words of the Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that 
are typically of no consequence to purchasers.”89 
The Court then rejected the contention that communicative products, or 
tangible goods that convey stories and information, deserve special recognition 
as to their “origin” under § 43(a).  To do so would conflict with copyright law, 
the legal regime set in place to protect creators and their rights to their works.90  
Furthermore, the Court identified several practical problems that would 
arise, should it permit attribution claims under § 43(a) in the context of 
uncopyrighted works.  First, the Court could find no limiting principle when 
considering the “origin” of an uncopyrighted work.91  The “origin” of a work 
such as the “Crusades in Europe” series could be the entities that supplied the 
video, the company that supplied the editing work, or Fox, the distributor and 
original copyright holder.92  As the Court interpreted it, “we do not think the 
Lanham Act requires this search for the source of the Nile and all its 
tributaries.”93  Additionally, the Court feared the burden a broader 
interpretation of “origin” would place on manufacturers.  Suddenly, they could 
simultaneously face liability for failing to credit the “origin” of the source 
material, as well as for creating the impression that the origin had endorsed the 
new product by crediting it.94 
Ultimately, the Court found no liability for Dastar’s having labeled itself the 
producer of the series.95  Fox’s video series had passed into the public domain, 
and “origin” referred to the origin of the actual physical good, not the 
underlying source material it contains, meaning that Dastar had technically 
“produced” the series.96 
                                                                                                                   
 89 Id. at 32–33.  Notably, this statement stands in direct contravention to the purpose of having 
moral rights, which allow the author to vindicate distortions or uncredited uses of his or her 
creative process. 
 90 Id. at 33–34 (“The Lanham Act . . . does not exist to reward manufacturers for their 
innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of 
exclusivity.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 91 Id. at 35. 
 92 Id. at 35–36. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 38.  The Court did note, however, that Fox and its fellow respondents had other, live 
claims to prevent Dastar from marketing its series, including copyright claims over the source 
material from Gen. Eisenhower’s still-protected book. 
 96 Id. 
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Dastar has received a round of criticism for its broad rejection of protection 
for the creative work contained in the good sold.97  Most notably, former 
Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters called the decision “ill-considered,” 
having “weakened the protection for moral rights that our laws offer.”98  She 
further urged Congress to amend § 43(a) “to reflect what was the long[time] 
understanding prior to Dastar—that section § 43(a) is an important means for 
protecting the moral rights of attribution and integrity.”99  Dastar severely 
curtailed one of the major sources of moral rights protection in U.S. law, 
thereby seriously undermining the “patchwork.”100 
Even if the Court had not so limited the use of § 43(a), it nevertheless would 
not serve the aims of “authors” harmed by anonymous online false attribution.  
First, as with VARA and defamation, the “non-author” of each piece must 
individually go to court and seek an injunction against the individual posting the 
falsely attributed work, as did the Gilliam plaintiffs.  This inefficient, costly, and 
antagonistic option does not provide an effective solution to mass instances of 
widely disseminated false attribution.  Second, even assuming a non-author 
wishing to disclaim foist-upon attribution desires to reduce consumer 
confusion, and thus may more exactly match § 43(a)’s goals, this is not the non-
author’s sole or even primary objective.  Indeed, § 43(a)’s commercial roots do 
not typically apply to a non-author in this context, who may not experience any 
economic harm.  Nor does the source of the false attribution reap any 
commercial gain.  Third, that source is anonymous, meaning that the entity with 
any possible motivation for the false attribution cannot be found.  This fact 
poses problems of proof for pursuing a § 43(a) action against ancillary false 
attributors, who merely passed on the work as it came to them. 
  b.  Section 43(c) Dilution: Recognition of an Attribution-Like Interest in a Mark.  
U.S. trademark law also provides remedies for harm done to the mark itself, and 
not simply to the consumer base, which source confusion addresses.  The 
dilution doctrine, contained in § 43(c), protects famous, distinctive marks from 
use by others if that use should result in dilution by either blurring or 
                                                                                                                   
 97 Carpenter, supra note 65, at 1628–29 (noting that the decision has received criticism for 
pushing the U.S. out of compliance with the Berne Convention, as well as for creating an overly 
broad rule inconsistent with Congress’s intent that § 43(a) serve this function). 
 98 Family Movie Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 4586 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and 
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th CONG. REC. 10 (2004) (statement of 
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office). 
 99 Id. at n.2. 
 100 See Carpenter, supra note 65, at 1644–45 (naming § 43(a)(1)(A) as the “keystone” component 
of Congress’s patchwork compliance with the Berne Convention, and noting that it no longer 
serves this purpose, post-Dastar). 
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tarnishment.  No actual, or indeed even likelihood, of confusion need result 
from the use. 
Dilution by blurring results when the junior, less famous “copycat” mark 
creates an association with and “impairs the distinctiveness” of the famous 
mark.101  In other words, “dilution by blurring consists of a single mark 
identified by consumers with two different sources.”102  When examining 
whether dilution by blurring has occurred, the Act directs courts to consider a 
non-exhaustive list of factors.  Factors to consider include the degrees of 
similarity, distinctiveness, and recognition of the famous mark, exclusivity of 
use by the famous mark owner, intent to create an association between the two 
by the junior user, and any evidence of actual association.103  This theory does 
not apply in the context of consumer confusion, since “dilution is a name for a 
kind of erosion of the strength of a mark that could occur in the absence of 
consumer confusion.”104 
Dilution by tarnishment, by contrast, occurs when the less famous mark 
denotes a service or good that harms the reputation of the famous mark.105  
Typically, the products or services denoted by the latter have an offensive 
connotation or purpose.  Alternatively, the junior mark may have the effect of 
degrading goodwill toward the famous mark.106  This less common action does 
not succeed as often as dilution by blurring, owing to conflicts with speech 
rights.107 
Unlike traditional trademark law, anti-dilution law focuses on harm done to 
the mark, with no concern for whether consumers are harmed.108  This arm of 
trademark law functions like a property law, where the famous mark holder’s in 
the power of the mark is at stake, rather than the consumer’s interest in its 
reliability.109  This speaks to the same interest at stake in cases of false 
                                                                                                                   
 101 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
 102 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:69 
(2014). 
 103 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)–(vi). 
 104 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 24:69. 
 105 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
 106 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 24:70. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003) (“Unlike traditional infringement 
law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law development, 
and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.”). 
 109 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 24:72; see also Kenneth L. Port, The Expansion Trajectory: 
Trademark Jurisprudence in the Modern Age, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 474, 495–96 (2010) 
(arguing that trademark law has evolved into a form of moral rights law, protecting the 
markholder’s attribution right and the mark’s integrity). 
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attribution: the author’s desire to preserve the goodwill associated with his 
name.  Reader confusion is not the problem.  In Vonnegut’s case, no reader 
mistook the attributed author for some other Kurt Vonnegut.  Yet the 
association of his name with something he did not write “diluted” his “brand” 
as an author.  Similarly, the association of Thomas Sowell’s name with an 
offensive “hit piece” about President Obama—moreover, a poorly written hit 
piece—tarnished his “brand,” as well, without any confusion as to alleged 
source.  
Once again, however, an exact comparison fails.  Section 43(c) specifically 
prohibits the use of the dilution doctrine for noncommercial uses of the 
mark.110  Thus, treating authors’ names as a “mark” under this section would 
not provide a remedy, as the use in cases of false attribution is noncommercial.  
Further, dilution exists for an entirely different purpose than one served by a 
remedy for false attribution.  Dilution focuses on the use of a mark similar to a 
famous one in order to denote a good or service coming from another source.  
The mark may be the same, but it denotes a different source.  Dilution seeks to 
obviate the need for a famous mark holder to qualify his goods or services (e.g., 
the classic Kodak camera/Kodak piano example).  False attribution, by 
contrast, uses the author’s name to identify the author.  The only qualification that 
may occur might happen when the author shares a name, as with the case of the 
two David Kaisers.  However, given the facts that the other “author” by the 
same name also did not write the piece, and that one cannot stop another from 
using his own name, dilution theory likewise would provide no remedy. 
  c.  Section 43(d) Cybersquatting: Protecting Trademarks Online.  Recognizing the 
unique challenges the Internet poses, and seeking to address those that arise in 
the trademark context, Congress in 1999 enacted the Anti-cybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).111 Codified in § 43(d) of the Lanham Act, 
the ACPA outlaws “registering, with the bad faith intent to profit, a domain 
name that is confusingly similar to a registered or unregistered mark or dilutive 
of a famous mark.”112  Most often, this occurs when a bad faith actor registers a 
domain name and then offers to sell it to the “rightful” holder, analogous to a 
“land grab.”113 Furthermore, “[c]ybersquatting is considered wrong because a 
person can reap windfall profits by laying claim to a domain name that he has 
no legitimate interest in or relationship to.”114  The law addresses the problem 
                                                                                                                   
 110 § 43(c)(3)(C). 
 111 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1). 
 112 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 25A:49. 
 113 Id. § 25A:49 (internal citation omitted). 
 114 Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 238 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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of enterprising individuals essentially extorting mark holders who were too slow 
in claiming their domain names. 
Another of ACPA’s arms addresses the specific problem of cybersquatting 
on non-trademarked personal names.115  To recover, a plaintiff must prove (1) 
that the defendant has registered a domain name (2) that is, or is confusingly 
similar to, the plaintiff’s name, (3) without his or her consent, and (4) with the 
specific intent to profit off the name by selling it.116  Unlike general trademark 
cybersquatting protection, there is no bad faith requirement; the plaintiff must 
show only that the cybersquatter intends to sell the domain name for 
commercial gain.117  A prevailing plaintiff wins an injunction, and possibly a 
transfer of the domain name.118  The court has further discretion to award fees 
and costs.119  This provision represents an occasion where Congress manifested 
an intent to allow people to control their own names.  Indeed, misappropriation 
of full names, parts of names, nicknames, and derivatives are all actionable.120 
Remedies for cybersquatting exist outside of American trademark law, as 
well.  The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
provides a mechanism whereby an aggrieved markholder may seek redress 
against a cybersquatter: the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(UDRP).121  The UDRP “is designed to be a simple, quick and inexpensive 
method of determining if a domain name has been the subject of 
cybersquatting . . . [I]t is intended only for clear cases of bad faith misuse of 
domain names of the type commonly known as “cybersquatting.”122  Similarly 
to the APCA, the registrant must have a bad faith intent to register the holder’s 
                                                                                                                   
 115 15 U.S.C. § 8131.  
(A) Civil liability: Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the 
name of another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar 
thereto, without that person’s consent, with the specific intent to profit from 
such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to that person or any 
third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person. 
 116 Id. 
 117 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 25A:81. 
 118 15 U.S.C. § 8131(2) (“Remedies.  In any civil action brought under paragraph (1), a court may 
award injunctive relief, including the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of 
the domain name to the plaintiff.  The court may also, in its discretion, award costs and attorneys 
fees to the prevailing party.”). 
 119 Id. 
 120 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 25A:81. 
 121 ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (1999), available at https:// 
www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-es-en. 
 122 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 25A:21.  For a more exhaustive discussion of this policy, see 
Zorik Pesochinsky, Almost Famous: Preventing Username-Squatting on Social Networking Websites, 28 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 223, 232 (2010). 
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trademark as a domain name with intent to profit commercially, as well as no 
legitimate interest in the domain name.123  That Congress has sanctioned the use 
of the UDRP speaks to its desire that some cases of cybersquatting be resolved 
without taxing the court system. 
However, UDRP relief is not as widely available in the context of personal 
names; indeed, because it is intended for use only by actual trademark holders, 
an individual seeking to stop a cybersquatter from using a personal name must 
prove secondary meaning to the name.  That is, the plaintiff must establish that 
his or her name is a common law trademark.124  Even celebrities have had 
mixed results in achieving successful transfer of domain names to them from 
the abusive registrants.125  However, like the APCA, the UDRP requires a 
finding that the domain name registrant has no legitimate interest in the domain 
name, beyond extortionary purposes.  This speaks to the balancing of interests 
that occurs in the false attribution context.  In cases of true false attribution, the 
one posting the false attribution has no legitimate interest in naming the non-
author; the non-author, by contrast, has every reason to want his or her name 
removed.  In both cases, the “bad actor’s” ability to prove a legitimate 
interest—one in owning the domain name, another in keeping the author’s 
name on the piece—may counteract liability.  Proof of a legitimate interest in 
either using the domain name or attributing the piece to the author eradicates 
the plaintiff’s claim, in the latter case, because the defendant has some proof of 
the plaintiff’s authorship. 
Although cybersquatting regimes mark Congress’s demonstrated intent to 
allow individuals—even private non-celebrities—to protect their names, the 
protection offered does not provide a remedy to false attribution.  Most 
obviously, false attribution does not involve registering a domain name using 
the author’s name.  Congress has expressed its intent that the cybersquatting 
protection should only apply narrowly, especially in the context of personal 
names.126  The protection provided is tailored to this purpose, and not easily 
                                                                                                                   
 123 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 25A:21. 
 124 Id. § 25A:31. 
 125 Compare Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd, WIPO D2000-0210 (2000) (ordering the 
transfer of the domain name juliaroberts.com to Julia Roberts), with Janine Turner v. Mercedita 
Kyamko, WIPO D2004-1036 (2005) (refusing a transfer of the domain name janineturner.com to 
the actress Janine Turner, and finding that the UDRP does not protect personal names in most 
cases, regardless of celebrity status). 
 126 Pesochinsky, supra note 122 (quoting 145 CONG. REC. S14696-03, at S14715 (daily ed. Nov. 
17, 1999) (“In sum, this subsection is a narrow provision intended to curtail one form of 
‘cybersquatting’ — the act of registering someone else’s name as a domain name for the purpose 
of demanding remuneration from the person in exchange for the domain name.”)). 
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amended to include within its purview the use of a name online for attribution 
purposes. 
Nonetheless, expanding the cause of action to cover misappropriation of the 
name online would not ameliorate the issue, either.  The requirement of intent 
to profit is often not present in cases of false attribution; in no case does 
anyone seek to extort or profit from the author’s name.  Much of the time, the 
name spreads because of a good-faith belief in authorship.  Furthermore, in all 
likelihood the plaintiff would have to prove that the cybersquatter intended to 
target that plaintiff specifically.  In the false attribution context, this would deny 
David Kaiser of MIT the opportunity to seek removal of attribution to David 
Kaiser of the Naval War College, although the former may receive fan mail 
intended for the latter. 
D.  THE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM: THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT 
ACT’S NOTICE-AND-TAKEDOWN SCHEME 
In order to accommodate the vast amounts of copyright infringement the 
Internet facilitates, Congress included in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act a 
quasi-judicial mechanism that allows copyright holders to seek removal of 
infringing material.127  This notice and takedown system is part of a statutory 
scheme that shields Internet service providers (ISPs) from liability fthat meet 
certain criteria.128  Notice and takedown allows for efficient resolution of 
infringing uses of copyrighted material, by eliminating the need for copyright 
holders to take each individual infringer to court.129 
Under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), an ISP may avoid liability for user-posted 
infringing content if the ISP does not have actual or constructive knowledge of 
the infringement, and upon learning of it, promptly removes or disables the 
infringing material.130  The ISP must also have a “designated agent” to receive 
these “takedown notices,” which trigger the removal.131  Section 512(c)(3)(A) 
then sets forth the elements a copyright holder must include in the removal: (i) 
a signature of the right holder or its agent; (ii) identification of the alleged 
infringed work; (iii) identification of the infringing material to be removed; (iv) 
                                                                                                                   
 127 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
 128 Id. § 512(c). 
 129 Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under 
Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
621, 631 (2005) (“In part, this was precisely the point behind 512: the efficient removal of 
infringing materials from the Internet in a fair process, with (in most cases) no need for court 
review.”). 
 130 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). 
 131 Id. § 512(c)(2)(A). 
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the complainants’ contact information; (v) a statement of the complainant’s 
good faith belief that the material was used in an unauthorized way; and (vi) a 
statement verifying accuracy of the foregoing information, and that the 
complaining party has a right to act on the right holder’s behalf.132  If the ISP 
acts promptly in response to such notice, it does not face liability to the right 
holder.133 
For its part, the party alleged to have infringed may issue a counter notice to 
the ISP, asserting that its use of the material was proper.  The general rule does 
not hold ISPs liable to users whose material was removed improperly, so long 
as the ISP meets three criteria.134  It must inform the user that the material has 
been removed, provide the original complainant with the counter notice, and 
replace the material within ten to fourteen business days from receiving the 
counter notice, unless the complainant files a court action against the user.135  A 
counter notice must include the user’s signature, identification of the removed 
material and its former location, a statement under penalty of perjury of the 
user’s good faith belief that the material was removed by mistake, the user’s 
contact information, and a statement consenting to federal jurisdiction.136 
Critics decry the potential unfairness and chilling effect on free speech that 
the notice and takedown system creates.137  The fear is that “if notices are sent 
when copyright infringement is alleged but unclear, or defective notices are the 
norm . . . Section 512 may represent a wolf in sheep’s clothing, allowing First 
Amendment-protected expression to be removed from the Internet cheaply, 
expeditiously, and without check.”138  Further, some question the fairness of 
extra-judicial removal of material from users’ websites.  The efficiency afforded 
to copyright holders may not be worth the damage done to the individuals 
whose material is wrongly removed.139 
Anonymous online false attribution is a relatively new challenge, having 
increased both in prominence and frequency throughout roughly the last two 
                                                                                                                   
 132 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi). 
 133 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
 134 Id. § 512(g)(1). 
 135 Id. § 512(g)(2)(A)–(C). 
 136 Id. § 512(g)(3)(A)–(D). 
 137 See generally Wendy Selzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the 
DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171 (2010) (arguing that notice and 
takedown functions as a “sword” against the general public, chilling free expression on the 
Internet, even as it wrongfully and mistakenly removes lawful speech).  See also http://www.chilli 
ngeffects.org, where Prof. Selzer and others catalogue cease and desist letters and DMCA notices, 
so as to study who sends them and what effect they have on online content. 
 138 Urban & Quilter, supra note 129, at 641. 
 139 Id. at 637. 
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decades.  It causes recognizable harm to the affected non-author, yet none of 
the laws currently in effect provide any redress.  This unique and new problem 
requires a tailored solution, and as this section has detailed, the underlying 
policy basis, as well as the actual enforcement mechanism for it, already exist 
elsewhere at law. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The inherent limitations of the foregoing legal protections, as well as courts’ 
unwillingness to expand existing laws too far beyond their four corners, means 
that the task of crafting a solution for the cognizable harm of false attribution 
falls to Congress.  By adopting a new cause of action for claims of false 
attribution, enforced by a DMCA-like notice and takedown regime, Congress 
could effectively cure a harm that occurs with ease and frequency.  The limited 
protection herein proposed would serve the problem at hand, without bringing 
to fruition the concerns that more comprehensive moral rights regimes 
engender in their opponents. 
This section begins by proposing the cause of action under which an author 
could move to seek relief, one that fuses elements of the causes of action 
described in Part II.  Next, this part establishes the legal basis for a relationship 
between the “author” and the attributor, derived from principles of agency law.  
Finally, this part proposes adapting the DMCA’s notice and takedown provision 
to the false attribution problem, while also addressing and quelling concerns 
about adverse effects on free speech. 
A.  THE CAUSE OF ACTION: FORMAL LEGAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE 
RIGHT AGAINST FALSE ATTRIBUTION 
Adopting direct protection against false attribution would not require too 
great an expansion of existing legal protections, and can be justified in light of 
the close relationship between an author’s reputation and creative persona.  
Further, the practical problems that may ensue from codifying attribution rights 
do not obtain in the context of protection against false attribution.  Thus, 
although enacting this proposed protection would require acknowledging a 
policy that the law has not yet explicitly recognized, it does not concerns to the 
level of alternative solutions that triggered skepticism among scholars and even 
some courts. 
The existing causes of action described above each speak to aspects of 
online false attribution, but nevertheless fail to adequately compensate for the 
harm.  VARA represents the only formal federal codification of moral rights 
25
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legislation.140  However, its limited scope of recognized injuries excludes 
authors who fall victim to false attribution, and its narrow terms have resulted 
in few successes to vindicate the right it protects.141  Defamation recognizes the 
harm done by the spread of false information about an individual, and can 
provide an author with a cause of action in certain situations of false 
attribution.142  Yet, because a defamation cause of action requires proof that the 
defendant knew the information he spread was false, defamation does not apply 
to the majority of online false attributors, who republish the “author’s” name 
honestly believing he wrote the work.143 Finally, trademark law does not help to 
solve the problem, either.  The Supreme Court has limited the cause of action 
for source confusion to tangible goods.144  Dilution protects a markholder from 
competitors in the commercial sphere from using the same or too similar of a 
mark to denote a different source,145 while false attribution harms the author 
because the wrongly used “mark” denotes the exact intended source.  
Cybersquatting is expressly limited to use in the context of domain names, 
when the offending party has sought to profit off of the use of a mark in which 
he has no interest, and to which he has no right.146 
Attempting to fit a false attribution claim under one of those existing causes 
of action likely would not work, in light of the attitude the Supreme Court 
expressed in Dastar.  That decision represents the Court’s unwillingness to 
extrapolate broader protections for moral rights under existing law.147  When it 
construed § 43(a), the Dastar Court focused on a narrow, rather literal 
conception of “origin,” one tightly bound to the overarching policies underlying 
trademark.148 The Court pointed creators back toward copyright, repositioning 
§ 43(a) as more of a consumer protection law than a creator protection law.149  
This close adherence to the aims underlying the law suggests that attempts to 
bootstrap moral rights protection to other sources of law may likewise receive 
                                                                                                                   
 140 NIMMER, supra note 44. 
 141 Ginsberg, supra note 50, at 282. 
 142 See, e.g., Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 168 N.E.2d 643, 645 (1960) (ultimately rejecting 
the claim in that particular case).  
 143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559. 
 144 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32 (2003). 
 145 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(B)–(C) (2012). 
 146 Id. § 1125(d)(1).  See also MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 25A:49. 
 147 Carpenter, supra note 65, at 1628 (“Dastar stands for the broad, bright-line proposition that 
‘reverse passing off’ claims brought under Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A) cannot focus on allegedly 
false claims of authorship, invention, or creation.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 148 Id. at 1627. 
 149 Id. 
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the same treatment.  Plaintiffs’ goals must align with those of the statute, now 
more than ever. 
Thus, falsely attributed authors have no legal recourse, as the existing laws 
do not consider the correct values at stake in the authors’ predicaments.150  The 
author does not chiefly suffer economic or reputational damage, which the 
existing laws of copyright and defamation seek to remedy.151  At times, the 
attribution could affect the author positively—consider Vonnegut, who was 
lauded by many, including his wife, for the falsely attributed “sunscreen” essay.  
It is conceivable that false attribution of a popular work could raise public 
awareness about the author, and even result in economic gains, such as 
increased sales of works the author did actually pen.  Yet the author has 
experienced some harm in the midst of these gains, as he has had words put in 
his mouth, so to speak.152 
Despite these shortcomings, however, each of these existing laws provides a 
stepping-stone to a cause of action specifically targeting false attribution.  These 
laws demonstrate that Congress has previously recognized and remedied 
elements of the false attribution problem, although it has never tackled it 
outright. 
An anti-false attribution act would make actionable an author’s right to 
control his own name.  The recognized harm occurs when an individual 
attributes a work to an author that the alleged author has not written.  The 
reasons for affording legal relief exist outside of economic and reputational 
realms, and instead rest on the author’s right against having work he did not do 
foist upon his name.  The remedy would be a limited injunction, allowing the 
author to seek removal of his name—but not the work itself, to which he has 
no rights—from the Internet. 
Such a law first has its basis in the United States’ obligations under the 
Berne Convention, which requires that signatory nations protect an author’s 
right to claim his work (and thus, disclaim work that does not belong to him).153  
False attribution speaks directly to the harm to the author’s “honor,” which the 
Berne Convention explicitly cites as a recognized injury.154  Enacting a law 
offering redress for false attribution is directly in line with the Berne 
Convention’s goals, and would thus better align the U.S. with its terms.155 
                                                                                                                   
 150 See generally Ross, supra note 30. 
 151 See Tushnet, supra note 27, at 790; Piotraut, supra note 26, at 555. 
 152 See KWALL, supra note 29, at 6; Damich, supra note 25, at 950. 
 153 Berne Convention, supra note 30, art. 6bis. 
 154 Id.; see also Damich, supra note 25, at 950. 
 155 See Ross, supra note 30. 
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Congress has already demonstrated a willingness to grant legal vindication of 
moral rights for visual artists, and specifically against false attribution, through 
VARA.156  A law addressing online false attribution of authorship would 
likewise function narrowly.  This law would give authors control of their own 
names.  It simply recognizes an author’s right to say, “I did not write that.”  
Indeed, such a law requires a moral rights justification precisely to maintain its 
narrowness.  Affording a property or trademark-style interest in a name would 
grant more legal power than required to address false attribution.  By contrast, 
giving legal force to a disclaimer of authorship merely allows the author to 
prevent the use of his name—not the use of the work—in the absence of proof 
to the contrary of his assertion. 
Viewed in light of the existing protections trademark offers, this solution 
does not represent a far-flung extension of current law in other areas, either.  
Laws remedying source confusion, dilution, and cybersquatting all recognize a 
markholder’s right to self-identify, and to control the use of his identity.157  
False attribution represents the ultimate form of source confusion: an author is 
named as the originator of a work in which he had no involvement.158  
Likewise, these wrongful additions to an author’s canon can blur the author’s 
distinctive voice, or tarnish his name—the very injuries against which dilution 
protects.159  At base, laws against cybersquatting permit markholders to enjoin 
the use of their marks by uninterested parties.160  In such cases, the using party’s 
only “interest” at stake is that of profiting off of the markholder’s name; at 
most, individuals who falsely attribute an author’s name seek to capitalize on 
the author’s “goodwill” to legitimize a particular point of view.  A law against 
false attribution borrows these principles and permits an individual who has 
been similarly harmed to prevent the use of his name any further. 
Some have expressed concerns about codifying the attribution right.161  For 
example, one commentator identifies problems of categorizing which works 
deserve attribution protection, and the burden attribution would have on 
authors’ latitude to borrow in their new creations from past works, as 
prohibitively high prices to pay for protecting an author’s right to attribution.162  
Further, forcing authors to cite all the works that influence their own harms 
                                                                                                                   
 156 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(B). 
 157 See Port, supra note 109, at 495–96. 
 158 Compare Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 159 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)–(C) (2012). 
 160 See MCCARTHY, supra note 102, § 25A:49; Harrods, Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 
302 F.3d 214, 238 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 161 E.g., Tushnet, supra note 27. 
 162 Id. at 795–96, 800. 
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audiences, who then must sort through notations of attribution.163  These do 
constitute legitimate concerns with respect to an attribution right, and help to 
justify why the U.S.—a nation renowned for innovation—may wish to avoid 
adopting such a protection wholesale. 
These problems, however, do not obtain in the context of online false 
attribution.  This commentator speaks of situations where new artists’ interests 
in having latitude to create, and the public’s interest in consuming these 
creations, outweigh the “borrowed-from” artists’ rights to attribution.164  This 
imbalance speaks to the fact that affording proper attribution places affirmative 
burdens on creators and consumers: for the former to attribute, and the latter 
to acknowledge the attribution. 
In scenarios like the four featured in this Note, the author’s interest is in not 
having his name attached to a work.165  Removing that name poses no difficulty 
for anyone seeking to use the falsely attributed source in creation of a new 
work, nor would its removal disrupt an audience’s experience of the work.  The 
author’s interest in protecting his creative persona here outweighs the other 
interests at stake.  Indeed, at best, that author’s interest may be in affording 
greater legitimacy to the work by misappropriating the non-author’s name, and 
at worst, the false attribution may have been perpetrated to actually damage the 
author’s standing.  Even the work associated with removing the attribution 
cannot be said to outweigh the non-author’s desire to disclaim work he or she 
did not produce.  The practical difficulties associated with an attribution right 
thus do not exist in the context of disclaiming attribution.  The legal basis for 
this protection does exist, however, and supports the creation of a new cause of 
action, one that grants authors control over their own name.  
B.  DEFINING THE PARTIES: AUTHORS AS PRINCIPALS, ATTRIBUTORS AS 
AGENTS 
Designing a scheme of relief for online false attribution also requires 
establishing the relationship between the parties—that is, the author and the 
attributors.  Agency law serves as an imperfect proxy for the author-attributor 
                                                                                                                   
 163 Id. at 801–02 (“Attribution proponents want audiences to care as much about authorship as 
the proponents already do.  But legal rights provide audiences with no reason to pay attention. . . . 
[T]he only way to get audiences to pay the ‘proper’ amount of attention is to jump up and down, 
blocking their view of something they want to see — and that has obvious costs to the 
audiences.”). 
 164 Id. at 798, 801. 
 165 MIT News, supra note 1; Sowell, supra note 3; Kaiser, I Didn’t Write That, supra note 4; Kaiser, 
Life in the Blogosphere, supra note 4. 
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relationship, and provides a conceptual framework on which to base a cause of 
action. 
Consider the falsely attributed author the principal.  By publishing various 
works under his own name, he grants others permission to attribute his own 
works to him.  It is with, and ostensibly in, his name that the attributors act; 
they, then, function as the agents.  The misalignment of interests that occurs 
when an individual falsely attributes a work to an author is analogous to the 
agent acting contrary to the principal’s wishes.  Correcting this misalignment 
forms the basis of relief. 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency states, “[a] principal has the right to control 
the conduct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted to him.”166  In this 
analogy, the “matter entrusted” to the attributor is to correctly attribute the 
work—or rather, not to attribute it to the “author” incorrectly.  The Second 
Restatement further states, “an agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to 
act in the principal’s affairs except in accordance with the principal’s 
manifestation of assent.”167  Falsely attributing a work thus functions like an 
agent making an unauthorized representation on behalf of the principal.  
Finally, an agent has a “duty to obey all reasonable directions in regard to the 
manner of performing a service that he has contracted to perform,”168 and the 
agent must not act contrary to the principal’s directions.169  In this analogy, the 
“author’s” stated disclaimer of authorship would function as the direction, and 
those who do not remove the false attribution accordingly have violated this 
“duty to obey.” 
Restatement (Third) of Agency also notes that the basis of an agency relationship 
is the principal’s consent, not his benefit.170  To apply this concept in the false 
attribution context, the goodwill Kurt Vonnegut experienced after attribution of 
the “wear sunscreen” essay would not excuse his “agents” for acting outside the 
scope of their duty to properly attribute his name. 
Agency law speaks also to the conflicting interests underlying a case of false 
attribution. Because the attributor himself has no real interest in attributing a 
work to the wrong author, nothing but his own conscientiousness would drive 
him to verify the authorship.  Likewise, “where an agency is involved, the 
                                                                                                                   
 166 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14(A). 
 167 Id. § 383. 
 168 Id. § 385(1).  Given the lack of a contractual relationship between an author and a 
reader/attributor, this analogy is inexact. 
 169 Id. § 385(2). 
 170 Id. § 8.09 cmt. b (“Moreover, the underlying premise of a relationship of agency is action by 
the agent that is consistent with the principal’s manifestation of assent, not whether an agent’s 
action is in fact beneficial to the principal.”). 
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speaker is merely representative of the principal sought to be bound by the 
admission.  He has no direct pecuniary interest impelling him to guard against 
misstatements.”171  This concept legitimizes giving primacy to the author’s 
interests over those of the attributors; the author—the principal—has much to 
lose, and his loss must precede the agent/attributors’.172 
Generally, a principal whose agent has violated or acted outside the scope of 
his duties may seek appropriate relief, including an injunction.173  In the specific 
context of the principal’s property—with the author’s name functioning as the 
“property”—an agent may be liable for either the value of the property or 
damages resulting from misuse.174  Stipulated forms of misuse include 
“unreasonably refus[ing] to surrender it on demand,”175 and “mak[ing] delivery 
of it to a person to whom [the agent] is not authorized to deliver it.”176  Both of 
these offenses have analogs in false attribution: the former occurs when the 
author requests the removal of the attribution and the attributor refuses, and 
the latter as publishing or sharing the false attribution. 
Treating the author/attributor relationship as a kind of implicit, informal 
agency relationship thus provides a basic framework from which to work when 
considering a scheme of relief for false attribution.  Treating the act of false 
attribution as an agent’s deviation from the principal’s interests allows for the 
establishment of a new cause of action based on a familiar legal relationship. 
C.  THE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM: MODIFIED NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN  
Because the primary harm suffered is neither economic nor purely 
reputational in nature, the false attribution law would relieve authors by 
preventing further misuse of their names.  Rather than attempting to bring 
every individual attributor to court, however, Congress could easily retrofit the 
DMCA notice and takedown mechanism to the problem of false attribution. 
The system as it exists needs only slight adjustment.  Using the same format 
as DMCA notice and takedown, the author notifies the ISP of the places where 
                                                                                                                   
 171 Reynolds v. W.T. Grant Co., 186 S.E. 603, 606 (W. Va. 1936) (noting also that “in many 
instances, the temptation to subvert the truth against his merely representative interest as agent in 
favor of some larger interest against his principal would give rise to fabrications, falsehood and 
fraud”). 
 172 In the case of false attribution, removing the non-author’s name from the falsely attributed 
work functions as the attributor’s “loss” or burden. 
 173 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 399(f). 
 174 Id. § 402(1). 
 175 Id. § 402(1)(c). 
 176 Id. § 402(1)(e). 
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the false attribution exists online.177  On receipt, the ISP disables access to the 
page, at which point the attributor may either agree to remove the attribution 
and have the page reinstated, or send counter notice that the user believes the 
attribution is correct.178  As in the original statute, the author will have the 
opportunity to respond to counter notice by filing suit against the user.179  
Likewise, to disincentivize abusive takedown notices, an author who files suit in 
response to a counter notice and who loses that suit—owing to evidence of 
authorship—will be liable for the user’s attorney’s fees and other costs of 
defending the suit.180 
This system may raise concerns about placing the burden of proving 
authorship on the attributor.  The author is vindicating a negative right, and 
thus will have no evidence beyond his own word that he did not write the work 
at issue.  Including the option for the user to provide counter notice grants him 
an opportunity to provide evidence of authorship.  If none exists, then the user 
strengthens the author’s case for removal.  If evidence does exist, then 
including a punitive element to combat wrongfully filed suits ought to result in 
judicious use of the takedown notice mechanism.  An author who merely 
regrets what he has written cannot therefore employ legal measures to scrub the 
Internet of his foolish words. 
Further, because the alleged author has no copyright in the work at issue, he 
cannot demand the work remain offline altogether.  After the false attribution 
has been removed, the user may have the original work reinstated (barring 
further action from the actual copyright holder).  This solution represents a fair 
compromise between the author’s and user’s respective interests.  The author’s, 
as established, is that of controlling his own name, and preventing its use where 
it does not belong.  The attributor, by contrast, has no legitimate interest in 
misusing the author’s name. 
The DMCA has many critics calling for its reform, but their concerns do not 
obtain in the false attribution context.  The law has engendered fear that 
aggressive takedown notices chill speech, and therefore that this system 
conflicts with the First Amendment.181  These critics argue that the DMCA’s 
extrajudicial remedy authorizes private citizens to carry out a task that would 
                                                                                                                   
 177 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(iv). 
 178 See id. § 512(g)(1), (g)(3)(A)–(D). 
 179 See id. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
 180 See id. § 512(f). 
 181 See Selzer, supra note 137, at 176 (“I add to prior scholarly analysis of the conflict between 
copyright and the First Amendment by showing how the copyright notice-and-takedown regime 
operates in the shadow of the law, silencing speech indirectly through private intermediaries 
where the government could not do so directly.”). 
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surely violate speech rights if the government undertook it: removal of lawful 
speech from the Internet.182  The DMCA, the argument goes, operates a form 
of prior restraint, limiting speech before it has been adjudicated on the merits.183  
It “flips the defaults on speech”: when the ISP receives notice from a rights 
holder, the presumption is that the speech is unlawful, and the party who 
posted it must then fight to prove its lawfulness.184  Additionally, the cost of 
pursuing a suit for reinstatement of the speech discourages users from posting 
content in the first place, thus suppressing lawful speech.185  Critics decry the 
DMCA as contrary to the prevailing principles in speech law, which treat false 
positives as the greater evil, and therefore allow greater leeway for free 
expression.186 
Yet the crucial differences between notice and takedown in the copyright 
and false attribution contexts render these concerns moot in the latter.  Most 
notably, unlike in copyright, the user in the false attribution context may repost 
the original work.  The falsely attributed author has no right to suppress the 
work itself, but merely the use of his name.  Thus, the only speech chilling that 
may result from this enforcement scheme would affect users’ attribution of the 
piece to the wrong author.  Therefore, the cost this enforcement mechanism 
imposes on attributors are low; authors, however, benefit greatly by regaining 
control of their names and, by extension, their bodies of work. 
Further, the haziness that can accompany a regular copyright takedown 
notice—namely, determining whether the content is subject to a fair use 
defense187—does not exist with false attribution.  When a copyright owner 
asserts that his work has been misappropriated, a host of questions arise as to 
what the alleged infringer used and how he used it.  The line in false attribution 
cases, by contrast, is much brighter.  Only one question needs answering: who 
wrote the work?  If the author’s answer is, “not me,” and there is no proof of 
his authorship, then the case is closed.  The user may repost the work, without 
the non-author’s name (indeed, without any name at all), and neither party is 
greatly harmed.188  The balance weighs heavily in favor of the authors, as the 
remedy is tailored specifically to the harm they suffer. 
                                                                                                                   
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 190. 
 184 Id. at 177. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 194 (“Typically, the chilling effect doctrine is concerned with excessive promotion of 
self-censorship.”). 
 187 Id. at 178. 
 188  Anecdotal experience suggests that users, for the most part, do not mind acquiescing to 
authors’ requests for attribution removal.  See Kaiser, I Didn’t Write That, supra note 4.  Thus, this 
system simply expedites the process for authors, allowing them to scrub their names from all 
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In addition, no legal protection currently exists for this problem, a factor 
that proves material when considering possible sources of redress for it.  Some 
took issue with the DMCA because it reduced judicial oversight of one aspect 
of copyright law.  By contrast, instituting any legal protection for authors’ names 
represents a step closer to individualized scrutiny of such misuses.  While the 
DMCA may functionally close a door to full court protection, a false attribution 
law opens that door.  
The individual components of a false attribution legal regime exist.  The 
cause of action amalgamates principles from copyright, trademark, and 
defamation law, the parties’ relationship functions as an offshoot of agency law, 
and the DMCA’s notice and takedown provision can adapt easily to the false 
attribution context.  Borrowing and combining these concepts to create a new 
law gives authors control of their own names at little expense to the attributors 
or society as a whole.  A false attribution regime would offer protection for an 
increasingly widespread problem, one that will continue to grow in magnitude 
as technology continues to develop. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
False online attribution has existed almost as long as the Internet has, and as 
written works become increasingly digitized, the problem has grown.  One 
misplaced name can spread like wildfire, and suddenly, the wrongly attributed 
author must defend his artistic honor from undeserved praise or disparagement. 
Currently the author’s only recourse is self-help: blog posts disclaiming 
authorship, or form e-mails correcting misguided readers.  No legal protection 
against false attribution currently exists; the basis for one, however, does. 
Such a law would fall under the umbrella of moral rights, which protect an 
author’s creative process and artistic identity.  The United States has already 
explicitly recognized these rights in the context of visual artists, and thus a false 
attribution law would function as an extension of an existing, albeit limited, 
regime.  Defamation offers limited protection for an author’s reputational 
interest, but only in the context of harmful, false publications about him.  The 
concepts of source confusion and tarnishment from trademark law allow mark 
holders to protect the power of their brand from people who would borrow or 
destroy the goodwill those marks generate.  Each of these causes of action 
speaks to an element of false attribution, and combining those individual pieces 
                                                                                                                   
reference to works they did not write without having to contact the owner of each individual 
posting. 
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into a single cause of action would allow authors to protect their names—
conceived of as a “brand,” or artistic reputation. 
This law avoids the problems that attach to its proactive cousin, attribution 
law.  Rather than requiring positive attribution, this law simply prohibits false 
attribution.  The practical difficulties associated with attribution law—especially 
the disruptive nature of repeated sourcing in artistic words—do not apply in the 
context of false attribution. 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s notice and takedown regime 
provides the enforcement mechanism for this cause of action.  In the copyright 
context, the DMCA allows the right holder to alert an ISP when a webpage has 
infringed on copyrighted material, and the ISP removes the infringing content.  
If the alleged infringer has done nothing wrong, he may issue counter notice, 
and the dispute may proceed to court.  However, the DMCA initially offers a 
streamlined solution to a widespread problem.  This same tool can help the 
victim of a false attribution protect his name by alerting ISPs when his name 
has been wrongly attached to a work he did not write.  The ISP then takes 
down the page featuring the false attribution. 
Some have expressed concerns that notice and takedown conflicts with the 
First Amendment.  However, as applied to false attribution, these effects fall 
away: the author in the false attribution context has no right to the work to 
which his name has been attached.  Thus, he cannot demand that the attributor 
take down the work altogether; the author only has a right to control his name, 
and not the work at issue.  The attributors retain the right to repost the work, 
and do not face the same speech chilling effects that accompany notice and 
takedown in the copyright context. 
Providing relief to authors aggrieved by false attributions requires minimal 
extension of current laws, yet ameliorates real harm to the author’s identity.  
Making this harm legally remediable acknowledges the effort, creativity, and 
considerable time an author pours into his own work, by excluding from its 
body that for which he is not responsible.  Such a regime rewards innovation—
a theme reiterated throughout intellectual property jurisprudence and 
scholarship—by giving an author some control over his name, and ensuring 
that he can distance himself from work that does not represent his contribution 
to society. 
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